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The year 2003 marked a significant change 
in Australia’s strategic relations with the island 
Pacific, including Papua New Guinea (PNG).1 
Since gaining independence in the 1970s, the 
states of the Southwest Pacific have been largely 
left to control their own political and economic 
affairs. While providing substantial amounts 
of bilateral aid, Australia has been sensitive 
to charges of neo-colonialism and interference 
with national sovereignty. All this appears 
to have changed, however, with the Howard 
government’s adoption of a distinctly more robust 
and interventionist approach. The objective is to 
restore or enhance security and stability in the 
troubled Pacific island states. Although poverty 
reduction and sustainable development continue 
to be its primary goals, the Australian aid program 
is now being calibrated to reflect Canberra’s new 
strategic priorities. In practice, there is also 
an increasing reliance on the deployment of 
Australian personnel in key government agencies 
in recipient countries. 
The two principal manifestations of the 
new approach are the Australian-led Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) that was deployed to Honiara in mid-
2003 and the proposed Enhanced Cooperation 
Program (ECP) to Papua New Guinea. Australia 
has also become actively engaged in the near-
bankrupt state of Nauru. Police Commissioners 
have been provided to both Fiji and Nauru. 
There has also been a focus on strengthening 
regional governance. In August 2003, Canberra 
secured the appointment of a former Australian 
diplomat as the new secretary general of the 
Pacific Islands Secretariat with a mandate to 
reform and invigorate this body. This reversed 
a longstanding convention that only Pacific 
islanders were eligible for appointment. John 
Howard has also made clear that future Australian 
aid to the Pacific will be linked to efforts by 
recipient governments to improve standards 
of governance and combat corruption. The 
new hands-on approach has inevitably ruffled 
feathers, not least among an older generation 
of independence leaders who resent Canberra’s 
stridency and the perceived threat this represents 
to national sovereignty.
While Australia’s renewed engagement 
with its Pacific neighbours is to be welcomed, 
questions arise as to what lies behind this change 
of policy and its likely impact in the recipient 
countries. Calls for a new approach toward the 
Pacific have been coming for some time from 
Australian ‘think tanks’, such as the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute and the Centre for 
Independent Studies, as well as from several 
prominent journalists with experience in the 
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region.2 RAMSI has been well received by most 
Solomon Islanders and has succeeded in restoring 
internal security within a remarkably short period 
of time. There also appear to be considerable 
popular support in PNG for the proposed ECP. 
Concerns about sovereignty expressed by some 
political leaders do not appear to be shared widely 
at grassroots levels. Although some might baulk 
at the naming of John Howard as ‘Pacific Man of 
the Year’ in a leading regional magazine (Callick 
2003), Canberra’s assertive new leadership has 
so far met with an overwhelmingly positive 
reception among the larger Pacific community. 
The full implications of these recent 
developments remain to be seen. It is still 
early days in respect of the engagements in the 
Solomon Islands and PNG, as well as in terms 
of the reform of regional governance. Canberra’s 
approach is also more ad hoc than it might at first 
appear. Graham Dobell, foreign correspondent 
for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, has 
suggested that it is essentially policy ‘made on 
the run’ (Dobell 2004). This quality, combined 
with the pace at which events are unfolding, 
complicates the task of evaluation. 
Regional and international media greeted the 
deployment of RAMSI as a bold new departure 
in Australia’s relations with the region. Writing 
in The Australian, Greg Sheridan referred to ‘a 
historic turning point in the way we relate to 
our neighbours’ (Australian 1 July 2003), while 
his colleague, Paul Kelly, stated that a ‘NEW 
phase of Australian policy has begun with the 
end of our 30-year hands-off approach to the 
Pacific region and the assumption of a role as 
the metropolitan power’ (Australian 3 July 2003). 
The ECP in Papua New Guinea has been read 
in a similar light. Whether or not Canberra’s 
approach amounts to the paradigm shift claimed 
by some (Kampmark 2003), the renewed focus 
on its Pacific neighbours is something that most 
observers would welcome. The region has all 
too often been relegated to the outer perimeters 
of Australia’s foreign policy agenda despite 
the mounting challenges facing a number of 
countries. 
Renewed engagement provides a rare 
opportunity to help Pacific island countries 
address these challenges. Indeed, if the level 
of commitment is sustained, it provides the 
most significant opportunity for implementing 
fundamental reform since the original era of 
decolonisation in the 1970s. Of course, much 
depends on what kind of ‘reform’ is being proposed 
and who is making the decisions. How closely 
does Australia’s new policy agenda correspond 
with the interests and priorities of the countries 
concerned? Clearly, the success and sustainability 
of these engagements depends, in large part, on 
high levels of ownership among the recipient 
countries. 
Having been criticised for not attending 
previous Pacific Islands Forum meetings, the 
Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, has 
now become a strident advocate for strengthened 
regional governance and has, among other things, 
called for the pooling of resources in areas such 
as airlines and police training (Lewis and Harvey 
2003). Few would dispute the limited impact of 
the Pacific Islands Forum. Since its inception, 
it has been an observer rather than a leader or 
shaper of regional developments. In theory, a 
reinvigorated vehicle of regional governance 
could assist the Pacific island countries, not least 
in their dealings with their larger and, at times, 
overbearing neighbours. Regional governance is 
a fact of political life in many parts of the world. 
The advantages of moving in this direction are 
obvious given the challenges of location, scale 
and diversity in the Pacific islands region. There 
has been a lot of discussion about regionalism 
over the past year. Many proposals were floated 
in the Australian Senate Committee Report 
— A Pacific Engaged — published in August 
2003. These included recommendations that the 
Pacific island countries explore the possibility of 
a shared currency and, significantly, a common 
labour market. The report also called for a 
common budgetary and fiscal discipline through 
the region (Australian Senate Committee Report 
2003). Many of these ideas are not new and have 
been around, in one form or another, for years. 
What is important is the opportunity for Pacific 
islanders to take an active role in building a more 
effective regional voice for managing domestic 
challenges and relations with the wider world.
While they present opportunities, Australia’s 
changing relations with the Pacific inevitably 
include an element of risk. The style and tone 
of the messages emanating from Canberra have 
already generated resentment among some leaders 
in the region. At worst, these statements can come 
across as condescending and arrogant. There is 
often little understanding demonstrated of the 
particular histories and social complexity of the 
Pacific countries. For example, Australia’s role as 
former administrator of PNG and the character of 
its colonial legacy are rarely acknowledged in the 
consistently negative assessments of that country. 
Canberra’s lack of sensitivity can, on occasion, 
generate resistance to proposals that might 
otherwise be well received. Last year’s friction 
between the Howard and Somare governments 
over the review of the Australian aid program is 
a case in point. 
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political realities of these particular countries 
and not simply derived from global templates. 
Appreciating the complexities of state- and 
nation-building in arguably the most ethnically 
diverse region in the world is also necessary for 
establishing realistic time frames.
•  The limited degree of consultation and 
negotiation with local stakeholders in the shaping 
and implementation of the new assistance 
programs is another area of concern. High levels 
of understanding, ownership and participation 
among both governments and local communities 
are critical to the longer-term success of these 
engagements. 
•  Obvious questions about sustainability 
are raised by these engagements. Assistance is 
increasingly delivered through the placement 
of significant numbers of Australian officials in 
key positions in domestic government agencies. 
What happens when these officials leave? Will 
the recipient country be in a position to sustain 
the benefits derived from them?
Before examining some of these issues in the 
context of Solomon Islands and PNG, let me 
return briefly to the character of Canberra’s new 
approach. As mentioned above, the evolving 
policy is more ad hoc than its proclamation 
as a major paradigm shift suggests. Moreover, 
while media commentaries have conflated the 
engagement in the Solomon Islands and PNG 
as illustrative of the same overall approach, 
there are important differences between the two. 
Likewise, while much is new, there are some 
important continuities with past policies. 
RAMSI is certainly new in terms of its scale, 
regional character, and the sheer ambition of 
its objectives. Commenting on the proposed 
intervention, Australian journalist Greg Sheridan 
said ‘We are seeking nothing less than to remake 
a nation’ (Australian 1 July). The Solomon 
Islands mission is the first example of regional 
assistance to a member state conducted, albeit 
retrospectively, under the auspices of the Pacific 
Islands Forum and the Biketawa Declaration. The 
latter, agreed to in 2000, contains a commitment 
on the part of Forum leaders to take collective 
action where there are security crises in member 
states. According to Australian Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, RAMSI is an example of 
‘cooperative intervention’, undertaken at the 
request of the Solomon Islands government 
with the participation of Forum member states. 
It is also new in terms of being a police-led 
intervention. The significant military component 
was provided essentially as back-up to the police 
and as a potent reminder to former militants 
and gunmen of RAMSI’s coercive capacity. 
More substantive concerns relate to Australia’s 
diagnoses and prioritisation of problems in the 
region and the kinds of remedial strategies being 
proposed. These can be summarised as follows:
•  The centrality of security considerations in 
Canberra’s current assessment of the challenges 
facing the Pacific islands and, in particular, the 
implications of viewing these countries through 
the lens of the Washington-led ‘war on terror’. 
Looked at in this way, the focus is squarely 
on the alleged threat posed to Australia by its 
nearest neighbours, particularly those states that 
are deemed to be ‘failing’ or at risk of ‘failing’. 
The issue of what precisely ‘failure’ means, what 
is failing, or why it is failing (e.g. the internal 
dynamics of crisis in the countries concerned) is 
rarely addressed in any depth.
•  Not surprisingly, this viewpoint tends to 
privilege solutions aimed at enhancing security 
particularly in relation to the perceived threats 
of international crime, people smuggling, border 
and customs control, and, of course, terrorism. 
While these and other potential risks cannot be 
ruled out, the question is how real they are for 
countries that are simultaneously facing a range 
of profound development issues? The prospect of 
Islamic terrorists establishing themselves in either 
the Solomon Islands or PNG is, to say the least, 
remote. Superimposing an external security agenda 
on the island Pacific risks obscuring more pressing 
domestic challenges, such as growing levels of 
inequality, impoverishment and marginalisation, 
as well as PNG’s potentially catastrophic AIDS/
HIV epidemic. There is the real prospect of 
a progressive securitisation of aid, with donor 
assistance being shaped progressively by an 
external, and questionable, security agenda.
•  A further concern relates to the state-centric 
character of the assistance being offered under 
the auspices of these engagements. While state-
building remains a priority throughout Melanesia, 
it is necessary to appreciate the historical and 
broader context of state ‘weakness’ in countries 
where the socio-political realities are relentlessly 
local. The postcolonial states in the Pacific have 
very different and much shorter histories than 
those of their more developed counterparts. 
State-building in the former remains at a 
relatively early stage. Recent developments raise 
important questions about the appropriateness 
of the centralised state and other aspects of 
the formal system of government inherited at 
independence. Greater appreciation is needed 
of the critical role of non-state and sub-national 
institutions in ordering the daily lives of most 
citizens. Appropriate and sustainable approaches 
to state building need to be grounded in the socio-
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At the same time, important antecedents for the 
intervention are to be found in Australia’s role in 
East Timor, Bougainville, and, more recently, in 
the successful collaboration between Australian 
and Indonesian police in the investigation of the 
2002 Bali bombings. These engagements have 
added considerably to Australian experience and 
confidence in the area of external interventions. 
In addition, as Greg Fry has pointed out, the 
decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands was, 
in many ways, a return to the policy of the former 
Hawke government of the late 1980s (Fry 2004). 
Under the so-called Evans’ doctrine formulated at 
that time, there was a commitment to intervene 
on behalf of the legitimate government of a 
Pacific island state, if requested, and where there 
existed an appropriate exit strategy. 
The Enhanced Cooperation Program in 
Papua New Guinea is different to RAMSI. It 
is not a regional initiative and has been agreed 
under the longstanding bilateral relationship 
between PNG and Australia. The mistaken view 
that it is essentially a RAMSI ‘Mark II’ aimed at 
rescuing PNG’s ‘failing state’ has contributed to 
tensions between Port Moresby and Canberra. As 
its name implies, the ECP is an enhanced form of 
the assistance that PNG has been receiving from 
Australia for many years. Australia’s substantial 
development assistance program to PNG has 
covered various sectors of government and, in the 
case of the police, has involved a major capacity 
building project dating back fifteen years. While 
the method of delivery will be new, the capacity 
building objectives of the ECP are by no means 
a radical departure from past practice. Likewise, 
many older ideas are being recycled in the case of 
the renewed focus on regional governance. 
What is new is the placing of seconded 
Australian officials, including police officers, 
in line positions where they will operate as 
employees of domestic government agencies, 
rather than as technical advisers or consultants 
working for Australian managing contractors. 
This is viewed by Canberra’s decision makers 
as a more direct and effective way of achieving 
change in the organisations and bureaucracies 
concerned. It is also an approach that unless 
handled with sensitivity and skill could easily 
generate resentment and resistance among local 
officials. From an Australian perspective, there 
are also considerable challenges associated with 
the ‘whole of government’ approach adopted in 
these engagements. More bits of the Australian 
government are now involved in development 
assistance than at any previous time in recent 
years. In addition to the Australian Federal 
Police (and probably members of state police 
forces in the case of PNG), there are likely to 
be officials from the departments of Defence, 
Treasury and Customs. Issues of coordination are 
clearly critical, not least to avoid reproducing 
Canberra’s bureaucratic rivalries in Port Moresby 
or Honiara. At the Canberra end, it is also clear 
that the Prime Minister’s Office has assumed a 
leading role in the formulation and steering of 
Australia’s new policy engagements in the region. 
Among other things, this means that key decisions 
are being made increasingly by those lacking 
extensive regional and development experience, 
while the traditional repositories of development 
expertise, notably the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID), are 
relegated to the outer circle. 
THE REGIONAL ASSISTANCE 
MISSION TO THE SOLOMON 
ISLANDS (RAMSI)
RAMSI was deployed in late July 2003 in 
response to an appeal from the Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister, Sir Allan Kemakeza. Canberra 
mobilised a regional assistance mission led by a 
police contingent of some 330 police officers, 
mainly from Australia but with participation from 
other Forum member states. The Participating 
Police Force was supplemented initially by 
around 1,800 military personnel from the region, 
again largely Australian. The military component 
has been reduced incrementally as the security 
situation has improved. Restoring law and order 
was the immediate priority to be followed by 
a comprehensive reform program aimed at 
stabilising government finances, balancing the 
budget, and reviving investor confidence, as well 
as strengthening the law and justice sector and 
rebuilding the SI police force. 
Was the intervention necessary? 
There were compelling reasons for external 
intervention. The Solomon Islands government 
was no longer in control of the country. Ministers 
and Treasury officials were intimidated routinely, 
often at gunpoint. The police force was hopelessly 
fractured and significant numbers had been 
corrupted. Government services had collapsed 
and revenues had been siphoned off. Many 
public servants had abandoned work and those 
who remained were not being paid regularly. 
The compensation process established under the 
Townsville Peace Agreement had been corrupted 
by former militants and political leaders. 
Kemakeza’s government was deeply compromised 
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with some ministers actively engaged in corrupt 
and criminal activities. Guns stolen from 
police armouries had been dispersed widely and 
presented a major security threat in Honiara and 
parts of Guadalcanal and Malaita. Faced with the 
collapse of the political centre, a number of island 
provinces were demanding greater autonomy and, 
in some cases, independence. With the closure of 
businesses and large commercial enterprises and a 
drastic fall in revenue collection, the country was 
effectively bankrupt. 
What began as an ethnic conflict had 
degenerated into the effective capture and 
paralysis of the Solomon Islands’ state by a 
small cohort of armed ex-militants, including 
renegade police officers, and corrupt leaders. 
This process of criminalisation of state (Bayart, 
Ellis & Hibou 1999) had accelerated under 
both the Sogavare and Kemakeza governments 
and had, in some respects, been facilitated by 
the provisions of the flawed Townsville Peace 
Agreement. ‘Authorities’ in Honiara were simply 
incapable of breaking the ensuing deadlock. An 
external circuit-breaker was thus necessary. For 
most Solomon Islanders, the main issue was not 
whether external intervention was necessary but 
why it took so long in coming.
Why did Australia decide to intervene when 
it did?
Canberra had declined several earlier requests 
for assistance from Honiara. Right up to the 
beginning of 2003, Foreign Minister Downer had 
claimed that it would be ‘folly in the extreme’ to 
send Australian troops to ‘occupy’ the country. 
According to the Australian Foreign Minister ‘it 
would not work’ because ‘(f)oreigners do not have 
answers for the deep-seated problems affecting 
the Solomon Islands’ (Downer 2003). Less than 
six months later, Australia mobilised and led the 
largest deployment of external security personnel 
to the Solomon Islands since World War II.
There is probably no single reason for the abrupt 
turnaround in Canberra’s approach to Solomon 
Islands. It more likely reflects the coalescing of 
a number of factors and considerations. Despite 
its protracted adherence to the older strategy 
of non-intervention, there had been mounting 
concerns in Canberra about regional instability. 
The ‘coups’ in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 
2000, and continuing problems of law and order, 
economic dysfunction and political instability in 
PNG, provided the basis for extending the idea 
of a regional ‘arc of instability’ to the Melanesian 
states. Parts of the Canberra policy-community 
were beginning to actively press for a new 
approach in the region. 
Concerns about aid effectiveness
An important contribution to this process 
of re-evaluation was the emergence of a strident 
critique of Australian development assistance 
in the Pacific region. This critique entails an 
unlikely convergence between critics on both the 
left and right of the political spectrum. On the 
left, critics from within recipient countries and 
Australia have long derided the aid program as 
primarily ‘boomerang aid’, whereby the principal 
beneficiaries are the Australian companies 
and consultants who manage and implement 
AusAID projects. On the right, there is the 
work of conservative economists such as Peter 
Bauer (e.g., 2003) and Helen Hughes, both 
working for the Sydney-based think-tank, the 
Centre for Independent Studies. Hughes’s 2003 
report, Why Aid has Failed the Pacific, received 
considerable publicity and struck a sympathetic 
chord in senior government circles. In it, she 
argues that Australian aid has failed to deliver on 
its promises and, moreover, that it is implicated 
in the dynamics of political and economic 
dysfunction in the region by fuelling corruption 
and engendering dependency among recipient 
states. The reality of aid and its impacts is, of 
course, significantly more complex and diverse 
than these critiques imply. There have been 
successes as well as failures. Likewise the link 
between aid and government corruption has 
declined with the move from budgetary support 
to tied-aid. Arguments for simply ending aid are 
unlikely to find much support even among the 
most ardent critics in the recipient countries. 
At the same time, few would deny that the 
Australian aid program can be, and needs to be, 
improved in terms of its practical outcomes. 
Changing strategic environment
The single most significant influence on 
Canberra’s thinking was, of course, the dramatically 
changed international strategic environment 
after the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the 
United States, the 2002 Kuta bombing in Bali, 
and, in particular, the ascendancy of the ‘war 
on terror’ as the principal lens for viewing issues 
of domestic and international security. Having 
aligned itself closely with the administration 
of the United States President, George Bush, 
Canberra has become acutely sensitive to security 
threats in what it regards as its own backyard (or 
‘our patch’ as Prime Minister John Howard puts 
it). Within this expanded concept of security, the 
notion of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states has become 
pivotal to the identification of perceived threats 
and the justification of preventive responses. 
  Lending a Fist?
6
The case for intervention in the Solomon 
Islands set within this broader strategic framework 
was articulated most clearly by the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), a government-
funded think tank, in an influential report, 
Our Failing Neighbour, published in June 2003. 
Launched by Foreign Minister Downer, the 
report identifies the Solomon Islands as a failing 
state and warns of its reversion into ‘a kind of 
post-modern badlands, ruled by criminals and 
governed by violence’ (ASPI 2003: 13). State 
failure in the Solomon Islands would, according 
to the report, render it vulnerable to the predatory 
activities of transnational crime syndicates and 
possibly even terrorist groups. If left unchecked, 
such developments would pose a direct threat 
to Australia’s own security interests. The risk of 
state failure emerges as the new strategic policy 
framework and is explained as follows:
The phenomenon of state failure represents 
a spectrum from weak states to states in 
total collapse. But the security challenges 
posed by a teetering state are often as 
grave as those posed by a failed state. 
Characteristics of state failure include 
economic deterioration, dramatically 
falling living standards, declining 
governance, failing institutions, and an 
incapacity to deliver services to citizens… 
Law and order breaks down, the state loses 
control of armed force, and groups look to 
their own kind to provide security (ibid.).
Within this framework, the focus is squarely 
on the catastrophic manifestations of state 
failure rather than the internal dynamics of 
failure. Likewise, the resultant security threats 
are conceived of as primarily those presented 
by ‘failing’ states to neighbouring states. The 
report adopts a regional perspective, noting that 
while the Solomon Islands’ state is closest to the 
‘total collapse’ end of the spectrum, some of its 
Melanesian neighbours are not that far behind 
(ibid.: 7). It is clear that PNG is viewed as the 
next in line in this respect.
Problems with the concept of ‘failed state’ in 
the Melanesian context.
There are difficulties with the concept of 
‘failed state’ and attempts, as in the ASPI 
report, to apply it to Melanesian countries. Not 
the least of these is the failure to ground the 
concept in the particular histories and socio-
political contexts of postcolonial Melanesia. It is 
a model that privileges conceptual neatness over 
detailed analysis of particular case studies. More 
generally, the notion of a failed or collapsed 
state implies that at one time it functioned 
effectively, presumably in a manner similar to 
the ‘successful’ states of, say, Australia or New 
Zealand. A cursory reading of colonial and post-
independence Solomon Islands or PNG history 
dispels this assumption. The Melanesian state 
has never operated effectively in the way the 
states of Australia and New Zealand have. To 
put it crudely, the real problem of state in the 
Solomon Islands, PNG, and Vanuatu, is not so 
much that it has collapsed or is in danger of 
collapsing but that it has never been properly 
built in the first place. We are still talking about 
the nascent stages of state formation in territories 
with extremely short experiences of centralised 
administration, acute levels of internal diversity 
and fragmentation, and little sense of a common 
or ‘national’ identity. The current challenge of 
state building is not to simply rebuild that which 
has ostensibly ‘collapsed’. To do so might simply 
be to invite ‘failure’ further down the track. 
What is needed is a fundamental rethinking 
about the kind of state and system of governance 
appropriate to the unusual circumstances of 
these countries. The most significant opportunity 
presented by the new policy climate is to do 
things differently and that means learning from 
the mistakes of the past. 
How has RAMSI fared so far?
The intervention has gone extremely well 
to date, particularly in the areas of disarmament 
and the restoration of security. By January 2004, 
approximately 3,800 firearms had been collected 
by RAMSI and the National Peace Council. As 
well as homemade weapons, these included a 
significant proportion of the high-powered guns 
and ammunition stolen from police armouries 
during the conflict. Key militia leaders have 
been arrested and await prosecution on a range 
of serious offences. A notable early success 
was the surrender of renegade Weather Coast 
leader, Harold Keke, within a month of RAMSI’s 
deployment. In its first 200 days, RAMSI made 
860 arrests and laid over 1,400 charges. 
The Participating Police Force moved quickly 
on the difficult task of cleansing the ranks 
of the Solomon Islands police of its militant 
and criminal members. By February 2004, 
over 50 police officers had been arrested and 
charged with 285 offences. Over 400 officers 
— approximately 25 percent of the workforce 
— have been removed from the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police (ABC Pacific Beat 19 Feb. 2004). 
There has also been progress in the larger 
task of rebuilding the law and justice sector 
with strategic assistance to the legal offices, 
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out that RAMSI’s dominance could lead to either 
a debilitating dependency or, alternatively, a 
perception of foreign occupation (Kabutaulaka 
2004). He notes the common saying ‘weitem 
olketa RAMSI bae kam stretem’ (wait for RAMSI 
to come and fix it) as an expression of this 
growing dependency.
•  The prominent stance adopted by senior 
RAMSI and Australian High Commission 
officials in opposing the Honiara government’s 
award of a pay increase to public servants in 
January 2004 bordered on political interference 
and attracted criticism in both the Solomon 
Islands and Australia (Wielders 2004). There is 
a thin line between RAMSI’s dominant position 
in post-conflict Solomon Islands and perceptions 
that it is actually the ‘real’ government in control 
of political and economic decision-making. Such 
perceptions cannot, of course, be resolved by 
RAMSI alone. There is a clear need for decisive 
leadership among Solomon Islanders and a much 
more active participation in the reform process.
•  The scope for popular misunderstanding 
of RAMSI’s role and work is very high. 
Understandings on the street and in the village 
differ markedly from those expressed in policy 
documents and official circles. RAMSI has a 
sophisticated communications strategy, but there 
is always room for improvement in a country 
where many people have little access to the 
media and where rumours are a significant part 
of daily life. Ensuring that rural villagers are well 
informed on this matter is a challenging but 
critical task. 
•  RAMSI’s post-conflict recovery work has 
understandably focused on key state institutions 
such as the police and the finance departments. 
In the longer-term, however, it is critical to also 
engage with non-state entities that continue to 
exercise more influence over the daily lives of 
most citizens than does the Honiara-based state. 
As Kabutaulaka puts it, ‘To achieve sustainable 
peace and rebuild Solomon Islands there is a 
need to strengthen both state and non-state 
entities. This is especially important in a plural 
society where the state will always share power 
with other organisations’ (ibid.: 2).
•  Related to this, is the need to complement 
state building work with the larger task of nation 
building in a country where lack of a sense of 
national identity continues to present major 
difficulties (Wielders 2004). Such a task cannot 
be undertaken by the state alone.
•  The question of what kind of state is most 
appropriate to the Solomon Islands’ present 
and future needs is clearly critical. The highly 
centralised model inherited at independence 
courts and prison service. Control has been 
regained over government finances and longer-
term governance and economic reforms have 
commenced. The remarkable turnaround on the 
security front is testament to the effectiveness 
of the RAMSI police component. It is also, in 
no small part, a reflection of the overwhelming 
support and high levels of cooperation provided 
by ordinary Solomon Islanders. 
Outstanding Challenges facing RAMSI.
The restoration of law and order in those 
parts of the country most directly affected by 
the conflict is a significant achievement. There 
nevertheless remain significant challenges as 
RAMSI moves into its second and more ambitious 
phase with a focus on governance and economic 
reform. Although popular support remains high, 
there are some concerns that, unless addressed, 
could lead to future difficulties. These can be 
summarised as follows:
•  There is a perception among many Solomon 
Islanders that while RAMSI has moved effectively 
against the former militants and gunmen, it has 
not pursued corrupt leaders with the same vigour. 
Questions are raised regularly in public forums 
about this apparent failure to move against the 
so-called ‘big fish’. The latter, according to local 
critics, committed serious crimes and played 
leading roles in manipulating, and profiting from, 
the disorder that preceded the intervention. As 
yet, most remain at liberty and some continue to 
occupy high offices. This has fuelled the view in 
some quarters that RAMSI serves as a cloak of 
legitimacy for leaders, and a government, that 
have lost the support of many ordinary Solomon 
Islanders. For its part, RAMSI officials have 
expressed frustration at the lack of evidence on 
which to base prosecutions in these cases and 
have called regularly for members of the public 
to provide relevant information. Whatever the 
reasons may be, this perception of an uneven 
administration of justice could lead to growing 
levels of popular frustration.
•  There also appear to be limited opportunities 
for ordinary Solomon Islanders to participate in, 
and influence, the work of RAMSI. This raises 
broader issues relating to ownership and the scope 
for local initiative. The scale of RAMSI and the 
scope of its activities underlie its popular image 
as the dominant force in post-conflict Solomon 
Islands. Without the active participation and 
engagement of Solomon Islanders in the processes 
of recovery and reform, there is also a real risk 
that the RAMSI exercise will simply reinforce 
dependence on external assistance. Solomon 
Islands’ academic, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, points 
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is deeply implicated in recent problems. While 
there are serious flaws in current proposals to 
establish a federal system, reform of the existing 
framework of government, in particular, relations 
between the political centre and island provinces, 
needs to be prioritised.
•  It is also important to ensure adequate 
levels of consultation and debate about the 
significant economic and public sector reforms 
being implemented under the auspices of RAMSI. 
Reforms that accentuate existing divisions between 
regions and individuals and that fail to improve 
access to services and economic opportunities 
among the bulk of the rural population will lead 
to growing levels of discontent.
•  Finally, there is the obvious question of 
sustainability. What happens when RAMSI’s 
considerable presence and resources depart? This 
is a question being asked a lot among Solomon 
Islanders and some indication of how this issue 
will be addressed is needed.
PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND  
THE ENHANCED COOPERATION 
PROGRAM (ECP)
Australia’s Enhanced Cooperation Program 
in PNG is informed by some of the same 
considerations as the intervention in the Solomon 
Islands. Both the manner in which it has been 
presented and the substance of its provisions 
reflect Canberra’s new approach. PNG is viewed 
as manifesting many symptoms — particularly 
lawlessness and economic dysfunction — that 
if left unchecked might lead to state failure. 
That, in turn, would render PNG susceptible to 
transnational crime and terrorism. 
Some members of PNG’s political elite have 
expressed reservations about Canberra’s new 
approach and, in particular, have objected to 
parallels drawn between Papua New Guinea and 
the ‘failing state’ in Solomon Islands. Although 
there are similarities, there are also important 
differences between the two countries. There 
has been no armed takeover in Port Moresby or 
the forcible ousting of a democratically elected 
government. While the state and key institutions 
such as the police may be weak, they have 
certainly not collapsed. Likewise, PNG’s well-
known law and order problems are not the 
result of a major internal conflict as occurred 
on Guadalcanal. PNG has long been the largest 
single recipient of Australian development 
assistance and a significant amount of this has 
been directed at the law and justice sector and, in 
particular, the police. Although there have been 
some improvements, the otherwise disappointing 
results of fifteen years of Australian aid to the 
PNG police has been another factor behind the 
formulation of the ECP. 
Australia approached the PNG government 
with its new proposals in late 2003 and these 
were agreed to by both governments at the 
Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum 
in Adelaide in December 2003. The program 
includes inputs to policing, law and justice, 
border management (e.g., immigration, customs, 
transport security), as well as economic and public 
sector management. The policing component has 
been costed at $AU800 million over a five year 
period and is additional to the existing $350 
million a year Australian aid program to PNG. 
The main features of the ECP are as follows:
•  Police: Up to 230 Australian police officers 
are to be deployed in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt 
Hagen, and along the Highlands Highway. As 
well, up to 20 officers are to be deployed in 
Bougainville. 400 new PNG officers will also be 
recruited under the program.
•  Law and Justice: There will be up to eighteen 
Australians working in non-policing roles in law 
and justice agencies. Positions will include that 
of Solicitor-General, three litigation lawyers in 
the Solicitor-General’s Office, five prosecutors in 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, two Correctional 
Service Managers, four expatriate judges, as well 
as further specialists in other key law and justice 
agencies.
•  Finance: Up to 36 Australian officials will 
work in key economic, finance, planning and 
spending agencies. These will be drawn largely 
from Australian Departments of Treasury and 
Finance and Administration.
•  Border Control: Ten Australian officials will 
work in PNG’s immigration services, border and 
transport security and management, and aviation 
security.
While many of the civilian officials are already 
at work, the deployment of Australian police has 
been delayed owing to disagreement between 
Canberra and Port Moresby over their conditions 
of employment. Canberra has insisted that they 
be provided with immunity from prosecution 
under PNG law and Port Moresby has refused 
to grant blanket immunity. Power plays in the 
PNG parliament around a possible vote of no 
confidence against the Somare administration 
have added to the delay. The impasse over 
immunity was recently resolved and, subject to the 
ratification of the new treaty by both Australian 
and PNG parliaments, Australian police should 
be in position before the end of 2004.
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Many of the concerns raised about RAMSI’s 
post-stabilisation work would apply equally to the 
ECP. These include:
•  Threats of international crime and terrorism 
in PNG appear to be relatively insignificant 
compared to more pressing internal challenges. 
The external security agenda sits uncomfortably 
with local socio-political realities. 
•  PNG’s ‘law and order’ problems are complex 
and diverse. They are not simply the reflection 
of the weakness of the law and justice system. 
Many are symptoms of larger processes of social 
and economic change. While law and justice 
performance needs to be improved, and the ECP 
can certainly contribute to this, many other 
underlying issues need to be addressed before we 
are likely to witness long-term improvements in 
the law and order situation. Control measures 
need to be supplemented by measures addressed 
at preventing crime and conflict. 
•  PNG is already engaged in an ambitious 
program of reform in the law and justice area and 
it remains unclear how the new assistance program 
will sit with the domestic reform agenda. There are 
likely to be difficulties integrating the two.
•  The law and justice component of the ECP 
is highly state-centric, while a major dimension 
of PNG’s National Law and Justice Policy 
emphasises the need to mobilise and strengthen 
community-based resources in order to build 
peace at local levels. There is a real risk that 
the significant role of non-state entities in the 
maintenance of peace and good order will simply 
be ignored.
•  How will the economic, and other non-
law and justice, assistance provided address 
the growing levels of impoverishment and 
marginalisation which contribute to the current 
law and order problems?
•  The large number of Australian officials to 
be placed in line positions raises familiar issues 
about long-term sustainability.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Canberra’s renewed 
engagement with its Pacific neighbours is a 
welcome and timely development. A major 
window of opportunity has opened. There is a 
significant role for external assistance in helping 
address many of the difficulties experienced in 
parts of the region. The success to date of 
the Australian-led intervention in the Solomon 
Islands provides ample evidence of what can be 
achieved. At the same time, assistance needs to 
be grounded in a thorough understanding of the 
socio-economic and political complexities of the 
recipient countries. Outstanding challenges of 
governance require sustained engagement and 
are not susceptible to quick or easy solutions. 
Many aspects of the fragility of the postcolonial 
states in the Solomon Islands and PNG reflect 
their particular histories and the weakness of 
their articulation with their domestic societies. 
Current problems cannot simply be attributed 
to the mendacity of a handful of incompetent or 
corrupt leaders. Nor can they be resolved through 
an exclusive focus on strengthening the principal 
institutions of state. Non-state resources also 
need to be acknowledged and, where appropriate, 
mobilised in the larger processes of building state 
and nation. This requires that greater weight 
be given to local circumstances, knowledge and 
expertise. The most difficult challenge of all 
remains that of long-term sustainability. 
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